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NOTES
The Emissions Trading Policy: Smoke on
the Horizon for Takings Clause
Claimants
Introduction
Before the Clean Air Act' (the Act) was amended in 1977, Congress
chose to enforce pollution regulations through a command-and-control
structure. This system placed heavy fines on polluters who exceeded
their licensed emission levels. It soon became clear, however, that the
command-and-control system was not working. By 1975, a substantial
number of air quality control regions throughout the nation continued to
violate national primary air quality standards for various pollutants.
Part of the failure of the command-and-control system was that it did not
reward companies for reducing their emission levels below federal stan-
dards. In 1977, Congress replaced the command-and-control system
with a marketplace approach. The reform was an effort to reduce admin-
istrative and enforcement costs, improve compliance, and reduce the
time needed to comply with congressionally mandated air quality
standards.4
The keystone to the reform plan was the Emissions Offset Policy.5
This policy stated that no applicant would be granted a permit to con-
struct a new plant in nonattainment areas6 unless the applicant obtained
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).
2. See Dudek & Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is This Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 220 (1988).
3. Landau, Who Owns the Air? The Emission Offset Concept and Its Implications, 9
ENVTL. L. 575, 578 (1979).
Of the 247 air quality control regions in the nation, 60 are projected not to meet
standards by statutory deadlines for TSP and 42 for sulfur dioxides. For oxidants, 74
air quality control regions have reported levels in excess of the national ambient air
quality standards .... A similar situation exists for nitrogen dioxide and carbon
monoxide.
H.R. REP. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 177-78 (1976).
4. Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,830 (1986).
5. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,526 (1976).
6. Nonattainment areas are those regions that have not met congressionally mandated
air quality standards. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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sufficient emission reductions from other plants in the region to more
than offset their proposed emissions.7 To facilitate the offset plan, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) created the Emissions Trading
Policy.8 This policy rewards businesses that reduce their pollution emis-
sions below allowable levels with Emission Reduction Credits (ERCs),
which are transferrable. An ERC represents pounds of emissions that
have been permanently reduced by a plant. Before a plant is allowed to
locate in a nonattainment area, the owner must obtain sufficient ERCs to
more than offset the future emissions from the proposed plant. The
ERCs can be "banked," 9 or saved, to offset future excess pollution cre-
ated by plant modifications or the construction of a new plant. Addition-
ally, ERCs can be sold to companies that seek to construct new plants in
nonattainment areas.10 Because businesses are allowed to buy and sell
ERCs on the open market, ERCs have become the currency of the Emis-
sions Trading Policy."1 The market system has provided positive eco-
nomic incentives for businesses to operate below their licensed emission
levels.
An early example of the practical effect of the 1977 amendments is
found in Oklahoma City. The city violated standards for both particu-
lates 2 and photochemical oxidants. 3 General Motors (GM) sought to
construct a new assembly plant that would emit more than 3,000 tons of
hydrocarbons per year. In 1977, GM was able to obtain throughout the
city ERCs that represented a reduction of 5,000 tons of hydrocarbon
emissions each year. Thus, GM's new plant resulted in 3,000 tons of
offset plus a 2,000 ton per year net benefit to the air quality.4
The Emissions Trading Policy creates an area of potential conflict,
7. Id.
8. 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076 (1982).
9. 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274, 3,280 (1979).
10. A result of the Emissions Trading Policy has been the rise of companies that buy and
sell ERCs. AER*X is a Washington, D.C.-based firm that acts as a broker exclusively trading
in ERCs. The firm has a lucrative business: revenues in excess of $1 million a year and busi-
ness growth of 30% per year. In 1988, for example, one of the company's clients, a fiberglass
manufacturer from Southern California, sought to sell its ERCs representing hydrocarbon
emission reductions of 1,000 pounds per day. AER*X brokers then searched lists of firms
seeking to expand or enter the market in the South Coast Basin. The company approached
real estate developers, engineers, and lawyers who represent clients interested in expansion.
The credits were sold to a sewage treatment plant for $1,250 per pound per day. L.A. Times,
Dec. 26, 1989, at 2, col. 3.
11. 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076, 15,077 (1982).
12. Particulates are any finely divided airborne solid or liquid material other than uncom-
bined water. 40 C.F.R. § 60.2 (1990).
13. Photochemical oxidant pollutants include ozone, nitrogen dioxide, peroxyacyl, al-
dehydes, and acrolein. These oxidants, together with solid and liquid particles, constitute
"smog." 14 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 750 (1974).
14. Bass, Cities Can Use the Clean Air Act Amendments as a Tool to Stimulate Economic
Development, City Weekly, Sept. 4, 1978, at 7, col 2.
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however, because it provides that local air quality management districts1 5
(AQMDs) may adjust the value of ERCs to achieve changing goals in
their region's air quality needs.16 The adjustment can take several forms:
a discount to reduce the value of all ERCs, an adjustment to increase the
use ratio of ERCs, I7 a confiscation of banked ERCs, or a moratorium
restricting the use of ERCs for a limited time.18
On June 28, 1990, The South Coast Air Quality Management Dis-
trict19 (SCAQMD) Board exercised the first adjustment option under the
Emissions Trading Policy plan. The Board's adoption of amendments to
Regulation XIII reduced, by eighty percent, the value of all ERCs that
resulted from plant shutdowns. 20  As a result of this action, an ERC
owner previously holding 100 ERCs acquired from a plant shutdown
now holds 20 ERCs. The SCAQMD Board declared that the prior regu-
lations did not lower overall emissions in the South Coast Basin and thus
new emission reductions were necessary to achieve federally mandated
air quality standards. 21 The regulation is an attempt to address the fact
that "[t]he South Coast Air Basin has one of the worst air quality
problems in the nation. Monitored ozone22 levels are nearly three times
the national standard.., and the Basin is the only area in the nation that
15. The Clean Air Act requires that states divide their geographic territory into air qual-
ity control regions in order to facilitate localized monitoring of air quality standards and li-
censing of new emission plants. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(c) (1988).
16. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,835 (1986).
17. A use ratio is also known as an offset factor. Under a current plan in the Los Angeles
area, the offset factor varies from 1.0 to 1.5 based on the proposed plant's potential to emit
pollutants. For instance, when a plant's potential to emit is one hundred tons per year or
greater, the owner must obtain enough ERCs to offset the plant's emissions by a factor of 1.5.
South Coast Air Quality Management District, Proposed Amended Regulation XIII, Rule
1303(b)(2) (Oct. 3, 1989).
18. 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076, 15,084 (1982).
19. The SCAQMD is the agency that oversees the South Coast Basin. See infra notes 87-
88 and accompanying text.
20. South Coast Air Quality Management District, Regulation XIII, Rule 1309(a)(2)
(June 18, 1990). The regulation only reduces ERCs that were the result of plant shutdowns
and leaves unchanged ERCs that were obtained through process changes or installation of
pollution control equipment.
21. The South Coast Basin has been established as a "sensitive zone." CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 40410.5 (Deering Supp. 1990). A sensitive zone is an area that has high
concentrations of pollution resulting in air quality which is highly sensitive to changes that
may affect air quality, such as atmospheric changes or emission level fluctuations.
22. Ozone is the result of a photochemical process. It is produced by the action of light
on oxygen that recombines the atoms resulting in three oxygen atoms to the molecule (03).
Ozone is used commercially "as a chemical reagent, as a disinfectant, in sewage treatment,
water purification, and bleaching textiles." 13 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 813
(1974). Ozone is an oxidizing agent that converts hydrocarbons from automotive exhaust
gases into aldehydes and acids. These aldehydes and acids contribute to the irritating nature
of smog. Id.
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still exceeds the nitrogen dioxide standard."23 The goal of the regulation
is "to achieve annual emission reductions that are at least five percent
greater than the total annual emission increases from new or modified
equipment." 2
4
The implementation of the SCAQMD plan or any of the EPA ad-
justment proposals will interfere with ownership interests in the ERCs.
This interference may be grounds for a takings claim.25 This Note ex-
plores the constitutional implications of the reduction plan in the context
of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Part I discusses the use
of market incentives as an approach to pollution control. Part II gives a
general overview of the Clean Air Act and its development since it first
appeared in 1963. Part III examines whether the ERCs constitute
"property" within the meaning of the Takings Clause and concludes that
they do not. Part IV assumes that the ERCs are property and analyzes
whether the ERC reduction under the SCAQMD plan is a legitimate use
of the state's police power. Part V addresses whether this reduction in
the value of ERCs constitutes a taking. Finally, Part VI examines the
issue of just compensation if a court concludes that a taking has oc-
curred. Specifically, I argue that even if a court finds that the ERCs
constitute property, their reduction will not give rise to a takings claim.
Pollution control is a legitimate exercise of the state's police power and
ERC reduction is a reasonable means to achieve this legislative goal. The
regulation's purpose is to promote the public welfare. A court should
not find a taking because the reduction does not interfere with reasonable
investment-backed expectations and the diminution in value is not suffi-
cient to result in a takings. Moreover, any reduction in the value of
ERCs held by a company is uncertain and insignificant because a reduc-
tion in the number of ERCs may be accompanied by an increase in their
monetary value due to scarcity. Thus, a court should find that the eighty
percent reduction in the value of ERCs is not a taking.
I. Pollution Control Through Market Incentives
The use of market incentives has proved to be an effective method of
pollution control. The flexibility of the Emissions Trading Policy makes
23. South Coast Air Quality Management District, Draft Environmental Assessment and
Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, Introduction to Proposed Amendments to Regulation
XIII, ch. 1, at 1 (May 1990) (footnote added).
24. South Coast Air Quality Management District, Regulation XIII, Rule 1301(a) (1990).
25. Indeed, when the first draft of the proposed amendments to Regulation XIII were
circulated among industries in the South Coast Basin, one pollution-emitting facility owner
wrote in, "We believe that a reduction of 80 percent of past valid ERCs amounts to confisca-
tion of property and is legally suspect. This creates disincentives to continue reducing emis-
sions, and if attainment is not achieved, the ERCs will be discounted again. This is similar to
condemnation of property." South Coast Air Quality Management District, Staff Report, Pro-
posed Amended Regulation XIII, at 25 (May 11, 1990).
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it easier for companies to comply with federal pollution control regula-
tions. An AQMD sets emission standards for a plant but allows the
company to tailor its own emission reduction program to meet the spe-
cific needs of the plant.26 A plant manager, for example, may decide to
install pollution controls, improve maintenance, alter production prac-
tices, or redesign equipment to meet his or her emission reduction re-
quirements.27 This flexibility allows companies to comply more quickly
and efficiently with emissions standards.
The goal of the market-based approach is to encourage compliance
with pollution regulations through positive economic incentives rather
than through fines that act as disincentives.28 Thus, companies that re-
duce their emissions below their allowable levels are rewarded with
ERCs that can be sold for profit. Under the former command-and-con-
trol system, compliance was carried out through fines for violations with
no incentives to reduce emissions below permitted maximum levels.
ERCs respond to forces of supply and demand as any commodity
does in a market system. The limited capacity of a parcel of air to accept
pollution creates a scarce resource in air.29 Thus, in areas that have not
attained the standard air quality required by the Clean Air Act, the cost
of adding additional pollution burdens to the airshed is very high. This
high price reflects the limited capacity of the airshed to accept more pol-
lutants.30 The market approach also encourages companies to seek alter-
native plant locations because the cost of locating in an area with scarce
ERCs is higher than locating in an area with many ERCs. The result is
26. Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 2, at 220-21.
27. Id. at 234. A good example of a company tailoring its own pollution control program
is Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M). The company initiated a comprehensive envi-
ronmental plan 15 years ago called "3P" for Pollution Prevention Pays. The plan includes a
program of revamping products, changing production processes, redesigning equipment, and
reusing materials. By modifying a manufacturing process, for example, 3M was able to cut
back on excess resin emissions from a particular process and save the company $125,000 per
year. Through the 3P plan, 3M reduced its emissions in New Jersey by 1,000 tons per year and
by 1,050 per day in Los Angeles. McKee, Environmental Activists Inc.; U.S. Companies With
Positive Environmental Commitment, NATION'S BUSINESS, Aug. 1990, at 28.
28. Increasing numbers of companies are responding favorably to the Emissions Trading
Policy and increasing their use of emissions trading. In Los Angeles, for example, the number
of offset trades grew from three in 1983, to five in 1984, to forty-two in 1985. Hahn & Hester,
Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J.
ON REG. 109, 121 (1989). The success of the Emissions Trading Policy also can be gauged by
the amount of money saved by industry each year. The EPA Emissions Trading Status report
states that bubble transactions alone have resulted in total cost savings of approximately $800
million. U.S. E.P.A. REGULATORY REFORM STAFF, EMISSIONS TRADING STATUS REPORT
(1985).
29. See Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 2, at 222-23. John Stuart Mill had economic
foresight when he stated, "'[I]f from any revolution in nature the atmosphere becomes too
scanty for consumption... air might acquire a very high marketable value.'" Quoted in
Yandle, The Emerging Market in Air Pollution Rights, REGULATION, July/Aug. 1978, at 21.
30. Id.
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to reduce the burden of additional pollution on nonattainment airsheds
and to allocate the pollution to airsheds, more able to absorb the new
pollutants. Further, it encourages companies to cut back on emissions to
create ERCs and thus to preserve this scarce resource because it has a
high value in the marketplace.
Under this marketplace approach, an important result of the
SCAQMD's plan to reduce the value of ERCs may be an increase in the
value of each remaining ERC. The SCAQMD has stated that the
amendment's
net effect on supply is uncertain, but it would probably reduce the
total supply of emission reduction credits because the volume of
existing shutdown credits exceeds the volume of emission reduc-
tion credit trades. Overall, the Proposed Amendment should have
an upward effect on emission reduction credit prices, although the
magnitude of that increase is uncertain."1
Thus, the reduction in the value of ERCs should result in increased scar-
city because there has been a reduction in the number of ERCs available
in the South Coast Basin. This scarcity should increase the price of
ERCs.32 Estimates of the scarcity in ERCs that may result once the
ERC reductions take effect is seen in the 1991-92 supply versus demand
forecasts for Retrograde Organic Gases (ROG).33 The allowable supply
of ROG after the ERC reduction has taken effect has been estimated at
31,000 pounds per day. The estimated demand, based on 1988-89 data,
has been estimated at 47,000 pounds per day. Thus, the demand exceeds
the supply by 16,000 pounds per day as a result of the ERC reduction.34
Increased scarcity accompanied by high demand should result in a corre-
sponding increase in the price that a firm is willing to pay for the ERC.
Therefore, any decrease in the number of ERCs held by a company will
be offset by an increase in the monetary value of the remaining ERCs.
31. South Coast Air Quality Management District, Draft Environmental Assessment and
Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, Proposed Amendments to Regulation XIII, ch. 2, at 16
(May 1990).
32. For example, Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo counties have very few available
ERCs; thus, it is very expensive to obtain ERCs in these counties. The price is much lower
where there is a glut of ERCs on the market. Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 2, at 235-36.
33. Retrograde Organic Gas is any gaseous chemical compound that "contains the ele-
ment of carbon; excluding carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, carbonic acid, carbonates and
metallic carbides; and excluding methane, 1,1,1-trichloroethane, methylene chloride,
trifluoromethane (CFC-23), trichlorotrifluoroethane (CFC-113), dichlorodifluoromethane
(CFC-12), trichlorofluoromethane (CFC-11), chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22), dichlorote-
trafluoroethane (CFC-114), chloropentafluoroethane (CFC-115), dichlorotrifluoroethane
(HCFC-123), tetrafluoroethane (HCFC-134a), dichlorofluoroethane (HCFC-141b), and
chlorodifluoroethane (HCFC-142b)." South Coast Air Quality Management District, Regula-
tion XIII, Rule 1302(u) (June 28, 1990).
34. South Coast Air Quality Management District, Staff Report, Proposed Amended Reg-
ulation XIII, at 4 (May 11, 1990).
The failure of the command-and-control method of pollution regula-
tion became apparent in the mid-1970s. Although the Clean Air Act set
a goal to achieve primary national air quality standards by 1975, by 1977
all but six of the nation's urbanized areas with a population of over
200,000 was nonattainment for at least one pollutant.3 5 The EPA's re-
sponse in the form of the Emissions Trading Policy was an innovative
approach to the problem of pollution compliance. The thrust of the re-
form was to replace fines with economic incentives. The flexibility of the
Emissions Trading Policy has proved effective in improving companies'
ability to comply with federal emissions standards. The Policy has also
encouraged companies to go beyond the minimal levels of pollution con-
trol required by law. Finally, market forces of supply and demand effec-
tively allocate new emissions sources to areas best able to accept
additional .emissions and reward companies most handsomely in regions
where additional emission reductions are most needed.
II. The Clean Air Act
A. The Early Versions of the Clean Air Act
The Air Pollution Control Act of 1955 was the first federal clean air
legislation. 36 The act was weak and primarily concerned research by the
federal government. In an effort to improve the nation's air quality, Con-
gress introduced the first version of the Clean Air Act in 1963. 31 Since
that time, the Act has gone through a series of amendments by Congress
and enactments by the EPA that have drastically changed its character.3"
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 require that the EPA set
nationwide ambient air quality standards (NAAQS),3 9 which determine
the maximum limits on the concentration of six criteria pollutants al-
lowed in the atmosphere at any given time.' The Act provides for each
state to be divided into air quality control regions.41 The state has to
then identify which regions within the state have attained national pri-
35. EPA Guidance Memo, ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 902 (Oct. 14, 1977).
36. Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
37. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
38. The Clean Air Act has evolved from a statute concerned with federal research pro-
grams and technical assistance for state and local governments to a comprehensive tool for
improving air quality. For a general discussion of the development of the Clean Air Act, see
generally Miller, Federal Air Pollution Control Legislation: A Selective Description, 1 ENVTL.
L. 105 (1970).
39. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1) (1988)).
40. Id. at Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(b)(1)(A) (1988)). The list has been increased since the 1970 version of the Act. Pollu-
tants currently on the EPA's list include asbestos, benzene, beryllium, coke oven emissions,
inorganic arsenic, mercury, radionuclides, and vinyl chloride. 40 C.F.R. § 61.01(a) (1990).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(c) (1988).
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mary and secondary ambient air quality standards and which have not.42
The latter are classified as nonattainment areas. Primary ambient air
standards are those required to protect public health.43 Secondary ambi-
ent air quality standards are those necessary to protect the public wel-
fare.' The Act then requires each state to set up its own state
implementation plan (SIP) for achieving primary and secondary
NAAQS. The 1970 version of the Act requires that each SIP be designed
to achieve primary NAAQS by 1975'5 and secondary NAAQS within a
reasonable time. 6 These plans are then to be submitted to the EPA for
approval.47 The Act requires that each proposed SIP contain specific
emission limitation schedules and timetables,4" establish methods of
monitoring and collecting data on air quality,49 and assure adequate
funding and personnel to implement the plan.50
The Act also directs that AQMDs set up a system of review for
applicants seeking to construct a new plant (a new source) or modify an
existing plant within a region."M This process is known as a new source
review (NSR). The NSR is a permit process by which AQMDs ensure
that issuing a construction permit complies with the Act's requirements
to "prevent the construction or modification of any new source.., which
the State determines will prevent the attainment or maintenance.., of a
national ambient air quality primary or secondary standard." 2 Thus, no
new source would be permitted that would further deteriorate, below fed-
erally-mandated air quality standards, the air quality of a region.
There were, therefore, no provisions for the approval of any new
plants in nonattainment areas in the 1970 version of the Act because any
new plant would add emissions to an already overloaded system. 3 This
prevented construction of new plants and expansion of pre-existing
plants in most urban areas. 4 In spite of the outcry from industry, the
EPA maintained its position preventing industrial growth in nonattain-
ment areas. The EPA stated,
Some have argued that a new source should be allowed to
worsen existing NAAQS violations if a 'cost-benefit' analysis indi-
cates that the economic costs of necessary emission controls or off-
42. Id. § 7407(d)(1).
43. Id. § 7409(b)(1).
44. Id. § 7409(b)(2).
45. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A)(i).
46. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A)(ii).
47. Id. § 7410(a)(1), (2).
48. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(B).
49. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(C)(i).
50. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(F)(i).
51. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(fi).
52. Id. § 7410(a)(4).
53. Landau, supra note 3, at 577.
54. Id.
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sets are excessive in relation to the resulting air quality benefits....
Congress and the Courts have made clear that economic considera-
tions must be subordinated to NAAQS achievement and
maintenance.5
The EPA's first attempts at using market incentives in pollution
control came in 1975 in the form of the "bubble" policy5 6 and the "net-
ting" policy. The bubble policy57 treats each plant as if it were sur-
rounded by an imaginary bubble. The plant does not suffer an emission
violation unless there is an increase in the net emissions from the entire
plant.5" Thus, emissions from one smokestack may increase so long as
there is a corresponding decrease from another stack. Bubbling thus cre-
ates a mini-offset program within the plant itself. The main attraction of
the bubble policy is that a company may modify its plant and avoid being
subject to an NSR by cutting back on another area of emissions within
the plant. The netting policy5 9 allows a facility to use its own credits
from surplus emission reductions from that facility to compensate for
increases due to permanent modifications within the same facility.' The
bubbling and netting policies were the first signs that the EPA would
relax its no-growth stance in nonattainment areas.
B. The 1976 Interpretive Ruling and the Clean Air Act Amendments
The EPA finally reconsidered its no-growth policy in 1976 with an
interpretive ruling61 that was later adopted in the 1977 Clean Air Act as
the Emissions Offset Policy. 62 The Offset Policy allows for economic de-
velopment in nonattainment areas through a system of offsetting future
new source emissions with present reductions. The Act provides that in
nonattainment areas
permits to construct and operate may be issued if the permitting
agency determines that by the time the source is to commence op-
eration, total allowable emissions from existing sources in the re-
gion... and from the proposed source will be sufficiently less than
55. Emission Offset Interpretive Ruling, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524, 55,527 (1976).
56. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416-58,417
(1975). See generally R. LIROFF, THE BUBBLE CONCEPT (1981); Butler, New Source Netting
in Nonattainment Areas Under the Clean Air Act, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 343 (1984); Landau,
Chevron, USA v. NRDC: The Supreme Court Declines to Burst EPA's Bubble Concept, 15
ENVTL. L. 285 (1985); Landau, Economic Dream or Environmental Nightmare? The Legality
of the "Bubble Concept" in Air and Water Pollution Control, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 741
(1980); Landau, Emissions Trading and Banking Under the Clean Air Act After NRDC v.
Gorsuch, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 803 (1983); Note, An Overview of the Bubble Concept, 8
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137 (1982).
57. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,830 (1986).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1988).
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total emissions from existing sources... prior to the application
for such permit to construct or modify .... 63
In other words, no application to construct will be granted unless the
operation will result in an overall decrease in emission levels in the re-
gion. Therefore, applicants seeking to construct a new plant or modify
an existing plant in a nonattainment area can do so only if they can ob-
tain sufficient surplus emission reductions from existing sources to more
than offset their future emissions. 6"
Approval to use emission offsets are granted only if the applicant
meets four requirements. First, the applicant must obtain sufficient emis-
sions reductions to more than offset the emissions of the proposed source
in nonattainment areas.65 This requires that the offset be more than a
one-to-one exchange66 and that the ERCs be of the same pollutant
type.67 Thus, an increase in hydrocarbon emissions can only be offset by
a corresponding reduction in hydrocarbon emissions from another plant.
The offsets must be such that they result in reasonable progress toward
attaining NAAQS.68 Second, the new sources of emissions must meet an
emission limitation that requires compliance with the lowest achievable
emission rate for the type of industry involved. 69 Third, the plan requires
that all existing emission sources owned by the applicant be in compli-
ance with applicable emission limitations.70 Finally, the proposed offsets
must provide a positive net benefit to the air quality of the affected
region.7 1
In 1979 the EPA issued an interpretive ruling that further modified
the 1976 regulations and allowed for "banking" of emission reductions. 72
Banking allows the owner of a plant that reduces the plant's emissions to
save those reductions for use in future new source permits. 73 The bank-
ing provision has proved invaluable to a company's ability to comply
with the requirements of the Clean Air Act. The provision increases flex-
ibility in the use of emission reductions and allows a company to reap the
63. Id. § 7503(1)(A).
64. In addition, the SCAQMD amendments expand this requirement to reach small firms
that were previously unaffected by the offset requirement. The proposal sets up a community
bank to assist the small firms and essential public service organizations in obtaining ERCs.
The proposal also increases the offset ratio based on the potential total emissions of the pro-
posed plant. South Coast Air Quality Management District, Regulation XIII, Rule 1309.1
(June 28, 1990).
65. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524, 55,529 (1976).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 55,528, 55,529.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 55,524, 55,528.
70. Id. at 55,524, 55,529.
71. Id.
72. 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274, 3,280 (1979).
73. Id.
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benefits of its own emission cutbacks by using them to offset future modi-
fications, bubbling, or netting. Banking assists growing companies to
plan pollution control more rationally. The EPA stated that banking
also allows states and communities to reap benefits because it encourages
companies to create reductions earlier and to disclose this information to
the state to help in emission control planning.7 4 Finally, companies may
trade their ERCs for money that can later be used to pay for pollution
control devices or to modify their plants later using their own banked
ERCs.
C. The 1982 Interpretive Ruling: The Creation of the Emission
Reduction Credit
In 1982 the EPA developed a comprehensive program to implement
the previously created Emissions Offset Policy of the Clean Air Act. The
regulation is called the Emissions Trading Policy.7 5 The Trading Policy
includes all aspects of the EPA's marketplace approaches: banking, bub-
bling, netting, and offsetting. The most important aspect of the ruling is
the creation of the ERC. The ERC has become a unit, much like cur-
rency, that represents an emission reduction by a plant.76 The regulation
sets forth legal requirements for the creation, storage, and use of ERCs in
order to further facilitate the use of emissions trading to achieve
NAAQS.77
Emission decreases must meet four requirements before they will be
considered an ERC. First, the reduction must be surplus. Only emission
reductions that are not already required by law will be considered sur-
plus reductions.78 Second, the emission reduction must be enforceable
under the state rules creating the ERC.79 Third, the reductions must be
permanent. s0 Finally, the reduction must be quantifiable, both in terms
of the amount of reduction and the description of its chemical
characteristics."'
74. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,825 (1986). The previous no-banking rule was deemed to
have had an adverse impact on pollution control by discouraging early cleanup of sources.
Owners would often delay retiring an obsolete plant until he or she needed the emission offsets
for immediate use. 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274, 3,280 (1979).
75. Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076 (1982).
76. Id. at 15,076, 15,077.
77. Id. at 15,078.
78, Id. at 15,076, 15,077.
79. Id. at 15,076. Each state has been granted authority under the Clean Air Act to
ate its own rules regarding the creation, registration, and transfer of ERCs. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 15,076-15,078.
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D. California's Implementation of the Clean Air Act and the SCAQMD
An important aspect of the Clean Air Act is its policy to reserve
power in the states to tailor their own pollution control policies to meet
their individual and particularized needs.82 This was accomplished by
setting air quality standards, or NAAQS, at the federal level and delegat-
ing to the states the task of creating their own implementation plans, or
SIPs. 83
California effectuated the Clean Air Act through the Air Resources
Act (ARA).84 The ARA adopts the Offset Policy85 and outlines proce-
dures for registration and transfer of ERCs.86 The ARA also divides the
state into air quality control regions and designates an AQMD to oversee
each of these regions." The South Coast Air Quality Management Dis-
trict (SCAQMD) is the regional agency that oversees Los Angeles, Or-
ange, Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties.88
The SCAQMD has responsibility for preparing and analyzing por-
tions of the SIP relating to current air quality, emissions data, and results
of air quality modeling within their air quality control region.8 9 The
SCAQMD is also responsible for performing NSRs and issuing permits
to construct new sources.
Ill. Do the ERCs Constitute Property?
An analysis of whether a taking has occurred must begin by decid-
ing whether the ERCs constitute property within the meaning of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.9' If the ERCs are not property
under the law, there is no compensable taking. It is well settled that
intangible ownership interests are property under the Constitution:
"[T]hat intangible property rights protected by state law are deserving of
the protection of the Taking Clause has long been implicit in the thinking
82. The Clean Air Act provides that "the prevention and control of air pollution at its
source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments." 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3)
(1988).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988).
84. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 3900044071 (Deering 1986).
85. Id § 40709.
86. Id § 40711.
87. Id. § 39002.
88. Id §§ 40400-40540.
89. Id § 40460(c).
90. Jack Landau describes the difficulty of conceptualizing air as property:
If anything cannot be privately 'owned', as the concept is traditionally viewed, it is
the air. It cannot be partitioned. There is no way to fence it in or parcel it out. Its
nature does not lend itself to being exclusively held by anyone, much less bought,
sold or traded in a market place.
Landau, supra note 3, at 575.
of this Court."91 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,9 2 the Supreme Court
found that intangible "trade secrets" create a property right under the
Takings Clause. Additionally, the Court has held that real estate liens
are property under the Constitution and subject to the Takings Clause.93
Similarly, valid contracts constitute property within the meaning of the
Takings Clause.94
Although ERCs are an intangible interest, however, they are created
through regulation rather than by private agreement, as real estate liens
or contracts are created. The Supreme Court has held that "[p]roperty
interests... are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are cre-
ated and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law. . . ,95 Thus,
property interests are defined by the state law that creates them. Because
ERCs are created under a regulatory scheme, the Court will look to the
statute that creates ERCs to determine their character.
The case of Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,9 6 which deals with inter-
ests in intangible trade secrets, presents facts similar to those created by
the ERCs. In Ruckelshaus, a pesticide producer brought suit against the
EPA, claiming that the disclosure provision in the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) constituted a taking under the
Constitution. The provision made the company's ingredients, formulas,
and tests available to the public, thus destroying its trade secret. The
Court first looked to Missouri law, which recognizes trade secrets as
property.97 The Court also used FIFRA's legislative history to support
its finding that trade secrets were property. The Court stated that "the
manner in which Congress referred to trade secrets in the legislative his-
tory of FIFRA supports the general perception of their property-like na-
ture.... Congress recognized that data developers like Monsanto have a
'proprietary interest' in their data."9 The Court further pointed to lan-
guage in the Act indicating that companies are" 'entitled' to 'compensa-
tion' because they 'have legal ownership of the data.' , In its final
analysis, the Court stated, "We therefore hold that to the extent that
Monsanto has an interest... cognizable as a trade-secret property right
under Missouri law, that property right is protected by the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment."" °
91. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984).
92. Id.
93. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 596-602 (1935).
94. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
95. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
96. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
97. Id. at 1001.
98. Id. at 1002.
99. Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. RP. No. 95-1560, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1978)).
100. Id. at 1003-04.
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The Supreme Court also examined the nature of the property inter-
est involved in Ruckelshaus. According to the Court, "This general per-
ception of trade secrets as property is consonant with a notion of
'property' that extends beyond land and tangible goods and includes the
products of an individual's 'labour and invention.' "101 In the case of
pesticide formulas, the Monsanto Company spent millions of dollars on
research and development to arrive at a formula with which to produce
pesticides. Although the formula is intangible, it is a concept that has
been created by the efforts of researchers and can be written down and
drawn upon to create a tangible object, a pesticide.
Many characteristics of ERCs, however, distinguish them from the
trade secrets held to be property in Ruckelshaus. In California, the ARA
provides that "[c]ertificates evidencing ownership of approved reductions
issued by a district shall not constitute instruments, securities, or any
other form ofproperty."1 °2 Thus, unlike the Missouri law that recognizes
trade secrets as property, ERCs are not considered property under Cali-
fornia law. As stated previously, intangible interests that are created by
state law are defined and limited by the laws that create them. 103 Nor is
an emission reduction an intangible "product" like a formula. Rather, it
is an absence of emissions. Under the Court's reasoning in Ruckelshaus,
the emission reduction is not a "product" created by "labour and inven-
tion." It is a result of installing pollution control mechanisms-a house-
keeping function.
The ERC owners may argue that although the ARA has stated that
the ERCs are not property, both the EPA's Emissions Trading Policy
Statement and the ARA itself establish an interest in the ERCs that in-
cludes all of the traditional characteristics of property. The term prop-
erty "denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the
physical thing, as the right to possess, use, and dispose of it."1" ERCs
constitute property under this analysis because they retain all of the
traditional characteristics of property. The EPA's Emissions Trading
Policy Statement declares that SIPs should establish ownership rights to
the ERCs to prevent two entities from attempting to use the same
ERC.10 The Policy Statement also provides that "[t]he owner or owners
of such approved reductions have the exclusive right to use them and
authorize their use."'106 ERCs may be transferred or assigned to a third
party, they may be banked for future use, and they are under the exclu-
101. IM at 1002-03 (citing 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405).
102. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40710 (Deering 1986) (emphasis added).
103. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); see supra note 95 and accompa-
nying text.
104. United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 37, 37-38 (1945). See also R. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 58-59 (1985).
105. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,849 (1986).
106. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40710 (Deering 1986).
sive control of the registered ERC owner.17 Thus, the company is able
to hold its "bundle of rights" pertaining to the control of a quantity of
emissions. Under the traditional definition of the term "property," the
holder of an ERC becomes the "owner" of title to a parcel of air into
which it may pollute or allow another to pollute to the exclusion of
others.108 Thus, ERCs fit the traditional definition of the term
"property."
The Supreme Court has held that when property rights are created
through regulation, no property interest exists unless the regulatory
scheme has created a vested right.109 In Bowen v. Public Agencies Op-
posed to Social Security Entrapment,110 the law was changed so states
could no longer withdraw from the Social Security system, which had
previously been conducted through voluntary participation. California
brought suit, claiming that the amended statute had deprived it of its
"contractual rights" without just compensation.II The Court held that
the contractual rights did not equal property because the rights had not
vested and therefore there was no fifth amendment violation. The Court
stated that
the "contractual right" at issue in this case bears little, if any, re-
semblance to the rights held to constitute "property" within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment .... [T]he provision was simply
part of a regulatory program over which Congress retained author-
ity to amend in the exercise of its power to provide for the general
welfare.... [Thus, it] did not rise to the level of "property."1 1 2
The Court pointed out that Congress had expressly reserved the power to
amend or repeal any provisions of the law to respond to changing
conditions. 113
The Emissions Trading Policy Statement requires the states to re-
serve the right to adjust state banking rules to achieve NAAQS. The
Statement provides that the "existence of banked ERCs must not inter-
fere with states' ability to obtain [] additional reductions. For this reason
state banking rules should specifically address how ERCs will be treated
if additional reductions are required."' 14 The Statement suggests several
methods: discounting adjustment, confiscation, or a moratorium on
use."' The ARA provides that each AQMD must create a plan for
achieving NAAQS in its region. The ARA states that "[u]pon adoption
107. 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076, 15,077 (1982).
108. Landau, supra note 3, at 597.
109. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55
(1986); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608-11 (1960).
110. 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
111. Id. at 49.
112. Id. at 55.
113. Id. at 51.
114. 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076, 15,084 (1982).
115. Id.
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and approval of the plan, such rules and regulation shall be amended, if
necessary, to conform to the plan." 1 6 The rules and regulations "shall
remain in effect and shall be enforced by the south coast district, until
superseded or amended by the south coast district board."' 1 The ARA
thus expressly reserves the right to amend any of its rules and regula-
tions, including those pertaining to the banking of ERCs. As a result of
this reservation, the ownership interests created in the ERCs are not
vested and therefore are not a property interest.
California law does not characterize ERCs as property. Further,
the interest in the ERCs created under the ARA is not a vested interest.
The statute retains the right to modify the ownership interest in ERCs in
order to achieve additional emission reductions within an air quality con-
trol region. The EPA has also provided that state plans should allow for
future reductions in ERCs to meet the changing air quality needs in the
area. In light of these factors, it is unlikely that a court will find that the
ERCs are property. For the purpose of the following takings analysis,
however, I will assume that the ERCs are property.
IV. Legitimate Use of Police Power
The Fifth Amendment states that no private property may be taken
for public use without providing "just compensation" to the property
owner. 1 8 The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides "nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law." ' 9 The takings clause analysis must begin by questioning
whether the act was a legitimate exercise of the state's police power. The
court would then have to determine whether there was a "taking" and if
so, whether the taking deserves compensation.
The takings clause cases require that the act in question be a legiti-
mate exercise of a government's police power. The Supreme Court has
described the "public use" requirement as "coterminous with the scope
of a sovereign's police powers."120 Therefore, once a legislature declares
that an act is for a public purpose, "'the right to realize it through the
exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is
merely the means to the end.' "121 The Court described the test, stating
that "[w]hen the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not
irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom
of takings-no less than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socio-
116. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40440(a) (Deering 1986).
117. Id. §40440(b).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
119. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
120. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1983).
121. Id. (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
economic legislation-are not to be carried out in the federal courts." '122
The Court applied this test in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff.12 3 The Court upheld legislation that required large landowners
in Hawaii to break up their holdings and sell these smaller parcels to the
current tenants leasing the property. The Court found that the legisla-
tion served a legitimate public purpose because the concentrated land
ownership was responsible for inflating land prices, adversely affecting
the state's fee simple market, and injuring the public's tranquility and
welfare. 24 The Court held that "[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils as-
sociated with it is a classic exercise of a State's police powers."' 25
The Court also explained that it was unable to "condemn as irra-
tional the Act's approach to correcting the land oligopoly problem."'12 6
Redistribution of land to correct deficiencies in the market was held to be
a rational exercise of police power. The Court reasoned that
when a sufficiently large number of persons declare that they are
willing but unable to buy lots at fair prices the land market is mal-
functioning. When such a malfunction is signalled, the Act autho-
rizes HHA to condemn lots in the relevant tract .... This is a
comprehensive and rational approach to identifying and correcting
market failure. 127
In the case of the SCAQMD's regulation, an eighty percent reduc-
tion in ERCs is a legitimate use of police power. Congress expressly gave
the power to the states to regulate pollution emissions. 128 California has
given the SCAQMD the power to create rules regulating emissions in the
South Coast Basin. 129 The ARA further provides that it is within the
SCAQMD's power to amend or repeal any existing rules. 130 Therefore,
it is within the SCAQMD's power to effectuate changes in the emissions
trading plan for the South Coast Basin.
The first prong of the Court's test in Hawaii Housing requires that
"the exercise of the eminent domain power [be] rationally related to a
conceivable public purpose." 13' The public purpose behind the
SCAQMD plan is to reduce emissions in the interest of the public wel-
fare. The SCAQMD Board has stated that "[t]he Proposed Amend-
ments to Regulation XIII are expected to reduce emissions of methylene
chloride, 1,1,1-trichloroethane, and the affected CFCs, which should re-
122. Id. at 242-43.
123. 467 U.S. 229 (1983).
124. Id. at 242.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (1988).
129. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40460(a), (b) (Deering 1986).
130. Id. § 40440(b).
131. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1983).
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duce public exposure to these potentially hazardous compounds." 132 Re-
duction of these chemical compounds will result in a benefit to the public
health including reduction of "anesthesia and cardiac sensitization re-
sulting from inhalation of high concentrations of these chemical com-
pounds."1 33 The SCAQMD's purpose behind the plan to reduce ERCs is
therefore legitimate because it seeks to reduce public health risks caused
by air pollution.
The second prong of the Hawaii Housing test is also met because
reduction of ERCs is a reasonable way to achieve the legislative end,
reduction of emissions in the Basin. The Clean Air Act requires that a
company wishing to construct a new plant or modify an existing plant in
a nonattainment area obtain a greater number of ERCs than necessary to
offset their emissions.1 34 This policy allows for a net decrease in emis-
sions in nonattainment areas, thus furthering the congressional goals of
the Clean Air Act.1 35 The new regulation reduces emissions even fur-
ther. By reducing the value of the ERCs acquired from plant shutdowns
by eighty percent, those ERCs that are erased from bank records become
permanent emission reductions in the region, never to be exchanged for
emissions from a new source. The result of the regulation is to allow
only twenty percent of shutdown emission reductions to be transformed
into future emissions. The SCAQMD has stated,
Devaluing old shutdown emission reduction credits contributes to
improving air quality in the Basin by eliminating at least a portion
of the potential air contaminant emissions. The remaining 20 per-
cent of the old shutdown emission reduction credits will be fun-
nelled back into the system and will be used primarily for third
party trades. 136
Thus, a company's permanent quantifiable reduction in emissions that
results in an ERC will be replaced with a considerably smaller increase
by a new source. This will lower the pollution levels in nonattainment
areas, bringing them closer to achieving congressionally mandated
NAAQS. The SCAQMD has estimated that "the Proposed Amend-
ments are expected to reduce future allowable emission increases by ap-
proximately 12,300 pounds of ROG per day ... [and] it is anticipated
that the District will comply with the California Clean Air Act require-
ments of demonstrating a five-percent annual emissions reduction." '137
132. South Coast Air Quality Management District, Draft Environmental Assessment and
Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, Proposed Amendments to Regulation XIII, ch. 3, at 23
(May 1990).
133. Id.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(A) (1988).
135. Id.
136. South Coast Air Quality Management District, Draft Environmental Assessment and
Socio-Economic Impact Assessment, Proposed Amendments to Regulation XIII, ch. 2, at 14
(May 1990).
137. Id. ch. 3, at 4.
The SCAQMD plan can further be seen as a rational means to
achieve the legislative goal because it is reasonable to require a reduction
in the value of the ERCs as an alternative to a Basin-wide plan that
would reduce every facility's emission ceiling. The devaluation of ERCs
imposes the expense of reducing pollution upon the companies that place
the added emission burdens on the system rather than placing the cost
burden on all companies. Although the regulation will make it more
difficult and costly for companies to obtain the requisite ERCs to build a
new plant, this burden should be placed on the company introducing the
increased emissions to the system. 138
Reducing pollution emissions is often costly, requiring expensive
pollution control mechanisms, reductions in plant use, and switching to
cleaner burning and more expensive fuels. A company with the re-
sources to build or modify a plant often has more ability to bear this
economic burden than companies that have made all possible reductions
and are successfully operating within their allowable emission levels.
As a policy consideration, the first reductions in an effort to control
pollution should be ERC reductions. Further, existing companies have
no alternatives because they are already established in the area, but the
incoming company can choose a different site location if the cost of ob-
taining ERCs is prohibitive.139 Emissions offsets are an expense that
must be figured into the cost of building a plant in a nonattainment area.
It seems inequitable to require companies operating within their allowa-
ble levels to reduce their emissions even further before seeking the reduc-
tions from companies attempting to introduce new emissions sources into
an already overloaded system.
138. The SCAQMD prepared a report to assess the socio-economic impact of the amend-
ments on industry in the Basin. The report states,
Across all industries offsets have, and will continue, to represent a very small part of
the life-cycle costs of most new sources or modifications. For a local company with a
major investment in plant and equipment the costs associated with securing offsets
for an expansion would be far less than those associated with shutting down and
moving its facility. For firms that choose to move out of the Basin, it is unlikely that
offset costs will be the primary factor motivating their relocation. The desire of new
firms to locate in the four county area clearly indicates that factors other than air
pollution control regulations play the major role in their decision. The fact that
companies want to settle here rather than in an area where they would not have to
obtain offsets is a clear indication that the economic value of locations in the Basin
outweighs the economic cost of obtaining offsets.
Id. ch. 4, at 31 (citation omitted).
139. Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 2, at 223. It is also important to note that firms
already located in an area do not have the same difficulty locating ERCs because bubbling and
netting offer them increased flexibility. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
Snriniz 19911 EMISSIONS TRADING POLICY
686 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 18:667
V. Was There a Taking?
Assuming a court finds that the SCAQMD action is a legitimate use
of police power, the next issue that must be addressed is whether there
has been a taking. The difficulty of formulating a takings clause analysis
when there has been a regulatory taking has "plagued the Court for over
six decades.""' As the Supreme Court has admitted, the takings analy-
ses are "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."'' The Court has relied
heavily on the specific facts of each case for its takings analysis. 142 The
Court's decisions have balanced several factors to determine when "jus-
tice and fairness" ultimately require the Court to find that a taking has
occurred. 14  This analysis becomes especially difficult when regulating
intangible property interests."4 The leading approach the Court follows
in cases in which regulations affect property interests is the three-factor
test announced in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.145
Under the Penn Central test, the Court examines (1) the extent to which
the governmental action interferes with reasonable investment-backed
expectations, (2) the economic impact of the governmental action on the
claimant, and (3) the character of the governmental action.1"
A. Interference with Reasonable Investment-backed Expectations
As part of its takings clause analysis, the Supreme Court has consid-
ered the extent to which the government action interferes with the rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations of the property owner. In
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court held that despite the fact that
pesticide formulas are a property interest,148 no taking had occurred
140. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 595 (2d ed. 1988). In the case of a
physical taking, the Court has provided a bright-line rule that any permanent, physical inva-
sion of an owner's property authorized by the government constitutes a taking requiring just
compensation. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35
(1982).
141. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
142. United States v. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
143. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
144. In order to prevent unnecessary takings, in 1988 President Reagan issued Executive
Order 12630, which required all governmental agencies to carefully consider the takings issue
when creating regulations. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988). In the Execu-
tive Order, the Presidential Task Force attempted to provide guidelines based on recent
Supreme Court decisions that agencies could follow when creating regulations. The Executive
Order reflects the difficulty in formulating any general rule for determining when a regulatory
taking has occurred or how to avoid one. Takings claims worth one billion dollars are cur-
rently pending in the Land and Natural Resources Division alone. Marzulla, The New "Tak-
ings" Executive Order and Environmental Regulation-Collision or Cooperation?, 18 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10,254, 10,255 (1988).
145. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
146. Id. at 124-25.
147. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
148. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
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under FIFRA's disclosure provision. The Court stated that
Monsanto could not have had a reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectation that EPA would keep the data confidential beyond the
limits prescribed in the amended statute itself. Monsanto was on
notice of the manner in which EPA was authorized to ise and
disclose any data turned over to it by an applicant for
registration. 149
The Court further held that the company should have been on notice
because a field of such high public concern is subject to extensive regula-
tion.'5 0 Thus, the EPA did not interfere with any reasonable investment-
backed expectations because the governmental action was foreseeable.
Similarly, the companies that own ERCs cannot have reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations that the ERCs will not be reduced. In the
Emissions Trading Policy Statement, the EPA allows states to guarantee
ERCs "so long as that guarantee does not undermine... or interfere
with progress and attainment should ambient standards change or addi-
tional emission reductions be required."' 51 Further, as discussed earlier,
the ARA provides that SCAQMD retains the right to amend or repeal
any rules or regulations.' 52 Both the Emissions Trading Policy State-
ment and the ARA that created the ERCs in California clearly state that
a district is authorized to adjust ERCs to attain NAAQS and to suggest
possible methods of adjustment. 153 The same law that creates and de-
fines ERCs also declares that they may possibly be devalued in the fu-
ture; therefore, ERC owners cannot have a reasonable investment-backed
expectation that they will never be reduced. Further, because air quality
is an area that has been extensively regulated by the government, the
companies should be on notice that their ownership rights are severely
circumscribed by regulation.
The Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus found the investment-backed
expectation factor to be dispositive on the takings issue. The Court
stated that "the force of this factor is so overwhelming ... that it dis-
poses of the taking question." ' Thus, the strong indication that reduc-
tion of ERCs does not interfere with reasonable investment-backed
expectations may be sufficient on its own to dispose of the takings claim
without reaching the other two factors.
B. Economic Impact of the Governmental Action
In its takings clause analysis, the Court has also considered the eco-
nomic impact of the governmental action on the property owner. In the
149. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1006.
150. Id. at 1007.
151. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,835 (1986).
152. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40440(b) (Deering 1986).
153. 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,849-43,850 (1986).
154. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005.
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Court's view, "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law...."I" Yet the Court recognized "that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking."' 56 The regulatory taking cases,
therefore, are an attempt to strike a balance between regulation that is a
reasonable infringement and regulation that has gone "too far."
The test the Court has developed is to inquire whether the regula-
tion allows the owner to retain some economically viable use for the
property.' 57 The test requires something more than a "mere diminution
in value"'"I to constitute a taking. Rather, the Court's application of the
test requires that the owner suffer a nearly complete loss in the use of his
or her property to have gone "too far" under the Takings Clause.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,'59 the owner
of the Grand Central Terminal in New York City claimed the city had
taken his property without just compensation when a historic landmark
ordinance prohibited the company from constructing a fifty-five-story of-
fice building onto the Terminal. The Court found that no taking had
occurred, relying heavily on the fact that the ordinance did not interfere
with owner's ability to earn a fair rate of return on the property.1 6° The
Court reasoned that because the claimant continued to derive economic
benefit from the property, there was no taking.
The same reasoning was applied in Agins v. City of Tiburon 1 61 in
which a property owner's prime real estate was zoned for single family
dwellings, which limited construction to a maximum of five dwellings.
The property owner, who had hoped to build condominiums, argued that
this massive reduction in value equalled a taking.1 62 The Court held that
despite the diminution in the value of the owner's land, the owner still
had use of the property, although in a restricted manner.1 63 A mere dim-
inution in value will not automatically constitute a taking.16' Rather,
when the property owner continues to derive some economic benefit from
the property, the Court is reluctant to find a taking.
The Court's decision in Andrus v. Allard 61 is an example of the
severity of a diminution in value the Court will allow without finding a
155. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
156. Id. at 415.
157. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66
(1979).
158. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
159. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
160. Id. at 136.
161. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
162. Id. at 257.
163. Id. at 262.
164. Id. at 261.
165. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
taking. In Andrus the Court upheld a statute prohibiting the sale of eagle
feathers against a takings claim. The Court found that a prohibition on
the sale of artifacts was not a taking because the Act did not completely
destroy the value of the property.1 66 The Court recognized that the most
important value the owner could derive from the property was through
sale of the artifacts. The Court found that no taking had occurred, how-
ever, because the owners could still derive some economically viable use
from the property, for example, by showing the property for an admis-
sion charge. 167 The Court stated that "[w]hen we review [a] regulation, a
reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated with a tak-
ing."' 161 In Andrus, the law has not only drastically decreased the value
of the property interest, but also deprived the owner of an essential attri-
bute of property ownership-the right to dispose of property. The
Court's failure to find a taking in this case indicates that the Court will
apply a low threshold of economic viability to avoid finding a taking.
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court found that there was no
taking even though there was a complete loss in the value of the property.
The Court recognized that
[w]ith respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is cen-
tral to the very definition of the property interest. Once the data
that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, or others are
allowed to use those data, the holder of the trade secret has lost his
property interest in the data.169
Thus, if FIFRA requires disclosure, the very nature of the property right
is extinguished. The Court found that protecting the public welfare from
possibly harmful chemicals sufficiently outweighed the owner's property
interest to justify extinguishing the property right.
An eighty percent reduction in ERCs is not as severe an infringe-
ment on an owner's property interest as the total loss of property in the
Ruckleshaus case. Further, it is not even clear whether the decrease in
the value of ERCs will result in a corresponding decrease in their mone-
tary value. As discussed earlier,1 70 the reduction of ERCs may result in
heightened scarcity, which will increase their price. Thus, the
SCAQMD's plan may have no adverse effect on the economic viability of
the ERC owner's property.
In light of Andrus, it seems unlikely that a court will find that an
eighty percent diminution in the value of the ERCs constitutes a taking.
The Court in Andrus pointed out that "loss of future profits-unaccom-
panied by any physical property restriction-provides a slender reed
166. Id. at 66.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984).
170. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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upon which to rest a takings claim."' 71 In Andrus, the Court placed a
prohibition on the sale of the artifacts, thus eliminating the most impor-
tant value to be derived from the property. To prohibit the method of
disposal of property is a fundamental infringement upon the owner's
"bundle" of property rights. SCAQMD's regulation is a mere reduction
in the value of ERCs. The basic property rights remain intact.
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the reduction in the value of
the ERCs that result from plant shutdowns constitute an eighty percent
reduction. The percentage may be much smaller if a court considers the
reduction in terms of all ERCs owned by a party rather than in terms of
ERCs only due to plant shutdowns. The Supreme Court has held that
when determining the extent of the government's interference with a
property interest, it looks to the extent of the interference on the property
interest as a whole, rather than on one specific portion of the property
interest. In Penn Central, the Court stated that" '[t]aking' jurisprudence
does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to de-
termine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abro-
gated."17 2 Rather, the Court focuses on "the interference with rights in
the parcel as a whole." '73 Thus, in Penn Central, the Court considered
whether the entire landmark site had been taken, here the entire city
block, and refused to focus its analysis on whether the airspace alone had
been taken under the Landmarks Preservation Law.74
The same argument can be made for the ERCs. Although the value
of the ERCs will be reduced, the ERCs are not a bundle of property
rights in themselves, but rather are one "strand in the bundle of rights"
granted by the Clean Air Act. Not all ERCs are being reduced--only
those ERCs that result from plant shutdowns. ERCs that result from
pollution control devices or process changes retain their full value.
When seen in this larger context, a reduction in shutdown ERC values is
a small reduction in the overall value of the owner's right to pollute.
When coupled with the fact that this reduction is for the legitimate and
compelling state interest of protecting the public health and welfare, the
balance weighs heavily in favor of allowing the legislation without find-
ing a taking.
C. The Character of the Governmental Action
When deciding takings clause cases, the Supreme Court also has
considered the character of the governmental action. One aspect of this
test is whether there has been a physical invasion of property. For cases
involving a physical invasion, the Court has announced a per se rule that
171. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 60 (1979).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 130-31.
174. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
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any permanent physical occupation of an owner's property, authorized
by the government, constitutes a taking.175 The character of SCAQMD's
action is not a physical occupation; therefore, this line of cases may be
dismissed in order to focus strictly on cases in which regulation has af-
fected property without resulting in a physical invasion.
When the governmental interest is protection of the public welfare,
the Court is less likely to find a taking. The Court has stated that the
public welfare issue is the "critical factor" in determining whether a tak-
ing had occurred. 176 In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis,177 the Court stated that the "character of the governmental
action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking [because the
State] has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to the
common welfare."'1 78 The Court focused on the character of the govern-
mental action rather than on the extent of the taking.
Similarly, the Court in Hodel v. Irving179 found that a taking had
occurred under a federal statute that prohibited the devise or descent of
small undivided interests in land held in trust by the United States for
Native Americans. The federal statute was implemented in response to
the difficulty in administering highly fragmented Native American lands.
Through successive generations the land splintered into smaller and
smaller parcels. The Court quoted from hearings before the Subcommit-
tee on Indian Affairs:
It is in the case of the inherited allotments, however, that the ad-
ministrative costs become incredible .... On allotted reservations,
numerous cases exist where the shares of each individual heir from
lease money may be 1 cent a month. Or one heir may own minute
fractional shares in 30 or 40 different allotments. The cost of leas-
ing, bookkeeping, and distributing the proceeds in many cases far
exceeds the total income.180
The statute required that any property interest that represented two per-
cent or less of a tract of land and had earned its owner less than $100 in
the preceding year to escheat to the Tribe upon the death of the owner. 81
Thus, the statute was designed to increase administrative efficiency
rather than protect the public welfare.
The most important factor in Hodel which distinguishes it from
Keystone and Andrus is that in Hodel the governmental action sought to
promote administrative efficiency, but in the latter two cases, the regula-
tions were created in the interest of the public welfare. Although the
175. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982).
176. Id. at 488.
177. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
178. Id. at 485.
179. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
180. Id. at 708 (quoting 78 CONG. REc. 11,728 (1934)).
181. Id. at 709.
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Court in Hodel seemed to rest its holding on the extent of the property
owner's deprivation, the holding is entirely inconsistent with Andrus if
supported solely on those grounds. In Hodel, the Court held that a tak-
ing had occurred because the regulation had destroyed one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of property rights, the right to pass property
to one's heirs. The Court stated that " 'the character of the Government
regulation here is extraordinary.... [T]the right to pass on property-to
one's family in particular-has been part of the Anglo-American legal
system since feudal times.' "182 The property interest in Hodel amounted
to income of less than one hundred dollars per year and a piece of land
that had been devised so many times that the owner's actual share was
less than two percent of the original tract.
In Andrus, the owner of the artifacts was also denied an "essential
stick" in his bundle of property rights-the right to transfer property to a
buyer. The regulation resulted in a massive reduction in what was once
very valuable property. The difference in the two cases, therefore, is that
in Andrus the government interest sought to protect an endangered spe-
cies while the interest in Hodel was administrative efficiency.
In the case of ERCs, the SCAQMD's action is to promote the public
welfare. The plan is a direct effort by the SCAQMD to reduce the
number of harmful pollutants in the South Coast Basin. Further, the
regulation calls for a mere reduction in the value of ERCs. The owner
retains all of the "essential sticks" in his or her bundle of property rights.
The regulation does not affect the owner's ability to retain, use, or dis-
pose of the ERCs. Therefore, although the governmental action may af-
fect the number of ERCs held by the owner, the basic rights inherent in
property remain intact. Further, the interest served by the ERC reduc-
tion is protection of the public health and welfare rather than administra-
tive efficiency.
In other takings clause cases, the Court has used a nuisance analysis
to establish the public welfare issue for governmental action. In Mugler
v. Kansas,183 the Supreme Court rejected a takings challenge to a Kansas
statute that prohibited the production or sale of alcohol within the state.
The suit was brought by beer manufacturers who claimed their property
had lost value due to the newly implemented law. The Court held that
the state's power to enact legislation protecting the public health and
welfare cannot be impaired by the Takings Clause. l" 4 As Justice Harlan
explained:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that
are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health,
morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be
182. Id. at 716.
183. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
184. Id. at 665.
deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit. . . . [T]he prohibition of its use in a particular way,
whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from tak-
ing property for public use .... In the one case, a nuisance only is
abated; in the other, unoffending property is taken away from an
innocent owner. 185
In the Clean Air Act, Congress has established that air pollution is
injurious to public health. The purpose of the Act is "to protect and
enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the
public health and welfare." 186 A strong argument can be made that air
pollution is a public nuisance and therefore the use of ERCs constitutes
noxious use of property. Devaluing the ERCs abates the public nuisance
in favor of the public welfare. Thus, the SCAQMD regulation may avoid
a takings challenge under both Keystone and Mugler because the charac-
ter of the governmental action is to promote the public welfare.
VI. Just Compensation
If a court were to find a taking had occurred, the issue of just com-
pensation would arise. Just compensation is determined by the fair mar-
ket value to the owner of the property at the time of the taking rather
than the worth of the property to the government.1 87 A court therefore
will look to the price at which ERCs of the same pollutant type, in the
same region, were selling at the time of the deprivation. In regions where
there has been little or no "external trading," ' 8 this figure may be diffi-
cult to determine. If this price is not discernable, a court may establish
the value by determining the cost to the company to produce the ERC.
This cost may include several factors, such as the cost of pollution con-
trol equipment, the increased price of alternative fuels, and the loss of
profits due to process changes. Calculating the cost of these variables
could become very speculative, however, because a court would be re-
quired to divide the cost between the control devices necessary to comply
with emission regulations and those used to go beyond mandated emis-
sion levels to create ERCs. The speculative nature of the market will
make the task of determining the just compensation issue difficult for any
court.
185. Id. at 668-69.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1988).
187. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74
(1973); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).
188. External trading is a term used to refer to trades with third parties rather than intra-
plant use of ERCs.
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VII. Conclusion
It is unlikely that a court will find ERCs are property under the law.
The statute creating the ERCs states that no property interest is created
and does not create a vested interest in the ERCs. Even if a court finds
that they are property, however, a reduction in their value should not
constitute a taking under the federal constitution. Pollution reduction is
a legitimate exercise of the state's police power because it has a direct
impact on the health and welfare of the community. The SCAQMD reg-
ulation that reduces ERCs in an effort to reduce the aggregate emission is
a legitimate means to achieve the legislative end of pollution reduction.
The ERC owners have no investment-backed expectation that the
ERCs would retain their full value. Both the EPA and the ARA have
provided for ERC adjustments in order to comply with the changing
needs of the air quality region. Courts should not find that the economic
impact on the owner is sufficient to constitute a taking. The ERC owner
may still derive some economic use from the reduced ERCs. A mere
diminution in value does not equal a taking. In fact, the credits may
increase in value due to the heightened scarcity caused by the reduction.
Further, the ERC owner continues to enjoy the rights associated with
property ownership. The owner may still possess, use, and transfer the
ERCs. The owner's overall bundle of property rights are unimpaired.
Finally, courts should be more willing to find no taking because the
SCAQMD's interest in the regulation is to protect the public welfare.
The former SCAQMD Regulation XIII only made small inroads on
emission reductions in the South Coast Basin. Because the South Coast
Basin is still far from reaching tolerable air pollution levels, the
SCAQMD enacted the eighty percent ERC reduction. With Los Ange-
les' air quality ranking among the worst in the nation, such regulatory
innovation is desperately needed.
The economic incentives of the Clean Air Act have provided some
of the greatest force behind its success. The reduced number of the
ERCs only affects the buyer, who has to pay more for each ERC because
fewer ERCs are available. Moreover, the ERC owner benefits from the
higher price per ERC. Thus, the SCAQMD regulation continues to al-
low both economic flexibility as well as increased compliance through
economic incentives without violating the Takings Clause.
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